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Abstract
Machine Learning-based malware detection is a promis-
ing scalable method for identifying suspicious applica-
tions. In particular, in today’s mobile computing realm
where thousands of applications are daily poured into
markets, such a technique could be valuable to guaran-
tee a strong filtering of malicious apps. The success
of machine-learning approaches however is highly de-
pendent on (1) the quality of the datasets that are used
for training and of (2) the appropriateness of the tested
datasets with regards to the built classifiers. Unfortu-
nately, there is scarce mention of these aspects in the
evaluation of existing state-of-the-art approaches in the
literature.
In this paper, we consider the relevance of history in
the construction of datasets, to highlight its impact on
the performance of the malware detection scheme. Typ-
ically, we show that simply picking a random set of
known malware to train a malware detector, as it is done
in most assessment scenarios from the literature, yields
significantly biased results. In the process of assessing
the extent of this impact through various experiments, we
were also able to confirm a number of intuitive assump-
tions about Android malware. For instance, we discuss
the existence of Android malware lineages and how they
could impact the performance of malware detection in
the wild.
1 Introduction
Malware detection is a challenging endeavor in mo-
bile computing, where thousands of applications are up-
loaded everyday on application markets [5] and often
made available for free to end-users. Market maintain-
ers then require efficient techniques and tools to continu-
ously analyze, detect and triage malicious applications in
order to keep the market as clean as possible and main-
tain user confidence. For example, Google has put in
place a number of tools and processes in the Google Play
official market for Android applications. However, using
antivirus software on large datasets from Google reveals
that hundreds of malware are still distributed incognito
through this market.
Unfortunately, malware pose various threats that can-
not be ignored by users, developers and retailers. These
threats range from simple user tracking and leakage of
personal information [21], to unwarranted premium-rate
subscription of SMS services, advanced fraud, and even
damaging participation to botnets [33]. To address such
threats, researchers and practitioners increasingly turn to
new techniques that have been assessed in the literature
for malware detection in the wild. Research work have
indeed yielded promising approaches for malware de-
tection. A comprehensive survey of various techniques
can be found in [26]. Approaches for large-scale de-
tection are often based on Machine learning techniques,
which allow to sift through large sets of applications to
detect anomalies based on measures of similarity of fea-
tures [7, 12, 17, 24, 29, 32, 36, 39, 44].
To assess malware detection in the wild, the litera-
ture resorts to the 10-Fold Cross validation scheme with
datasets that we claim are biased and yield biased re-
sults. Indeed, various aspects of construction of train-
ing datasets are usually overlooked. Among such as-
pects is the history aspect which assumes that the train-
ing dataset, which is used for building classifiers, and the
test dataset, which is used to assess the performance of
the technique, should be historically coherent: the for-
mer must be historically anterior to the latter. This as-
pect is indeed a highly relevant constraint for real-world
use cases and we feel that evaluation and practical use of
state-of-the-art malware detection approaches must fol-
low a process that mimics the history of creation/arrival
of applications in markets as well as the history of ap-
pearance of malware: detecting malware before they are
publicly distributed in markets is probably more useful
than identifying them several months after they have been
made available.
Nevertheless, in the state-of-the-art literature, the
datasets of evaluation are borrowed from well-known la-
belled repositories of apps, such as the Genome project,
or constructed randomly, using market-downloaded
apps, with the help of Antivirus products. However,
the history of creation of the various apps that form the
datasets are rarely, if ever, considered, leading to situ-
ations where some items in the training datasets are
“from the future”, i.e., historically posterior to items
in the tested dataset. Thus, different research questions
are systematically eluded in the discussion of malware
detector performance:
RQ-1. Is a randomly sampled training dataset equiva-
lent to a dataset that is historically coherent to the test
dataset?
RQ-2. What is the impact of using malware knowledge
”from the future” to detect malware in the present?
RQ-3. How can the potential existence of families of
malware impact the features that are considered by ma-
chine learning classifiers?
RQ-4. How fresh must be the apps from the training
dataset to yield the best classification results?
RQ-5. Is it sound/wise to account for all known malware
to build a training dataset?
RQ-6. Finally, what are the steps to take towards build-
ing a reliable training dataset?
This paper. We propose in this paper to investigate
the effect of ignoring/considering historical coherence in
the selection of training and test datasets for malware de-
tection processes that are built on top of Machine learn-
ing techniques. Indeed we note from literature reviews
that most authors do not take this into account. Our ul-
timate aim is thus to provide insights for building ap-
proaches that are consistent with the practice of applica-
tion –including malware– development and registration
into markets. To this end, we have devised several typ-
ical machine learning classifiers and built a set of fea-
tures which are textual representations of basic blocks
extracted from the Control-Flow Graph of applications’
byte-code. Our experiments are also based on a sizeable
dataset of about 200,000 Android applications collected
from sources that are used by authors of contributions on
machine learning-based malware detection.
The contributions of this paper are:
• We propose a thorough study of the history aspect
in the selection of training datasets. Our discussions
highlight different biases that may be introduced if
this aspect is ignored or misused.
• Through extensive experiments with tens of thou-
sands of Android apps, we show the variations that
the choice of datasets age can have on the malware
detection output. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to raise this issue and to evaluate its im-
portance in practice.
• We confirm, or show how our experiments support,
various intuitions on Android malware, including
the existence of so-called lineages.
• Finally, based on our findings, we discuss (1) the as-
sessment protocols of machine learning-based mal-
ware detection techniques, and (2) the design of
datasets for training real-world malware detectors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 provides some background on machine
learning-based malware detection and highlights the as-
sociated assumptions on dataset constructions. We also
briefly describe our own example of machine-learning
based malware detection. Section 3 presents related
work to support the ground for our work. Section 4 de-
scribes the experiments that we have carried out to an-
swer the research questions, and presents the take-home
messages derived from our empirical study. We propose
a final discussion on our findings in Section 5 and con-
clude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
The Android mobile platform has now become the most
popular platform with estimated hundreds of thousands
of apps in the official Google Play market alone and
downloads in excess of billions. Unfortunately, as this
popularity has been growing, so is malicious software,
i.e., malware, targeting this platform. Studies have
shown that, on average, Android malware remain unno-
ticed up to 3 months before a security researcher stum-
bles on it [6], leaving users vulnerable in the mean time.
Security researchers are constantly working to propose
new malware detection techniques, including machine
learning-based approaches, to reduce this 3- months gap.
The following sub-sections present the main concepts
upon which a machine learning approach is based. More-
over, we describe our dataset and our overall methodol-
ogy.
2.1 Malware Detection in the wild
In February 2012, Google has introduced the
Bouncer [23] which leverages on dynamic analysis
to identify malware based on execution behavior. The
current rates of malware appearing in Google Play
demonstrates however that this analysis can be cir-
cumvented. Besides, a number of third party Android
markets are currently growing, most of which might take
less steps to scrutinize apps before upload.
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To better devise techniques and tools for fighting mal-
ware, researchers must have at disposal an extensive
knowledge on existing malware. Unfortunately, spotting
malicious samples in Android is also difficult [6]: secu-
rity practitionners have hard time collecting all Android
apps and end-users are not always aware of malicious
activities that need reporting. To detect zero-day mal-
ware attacks, i.e., attacks that were previously unknown
to the malware detector, researchers resort to anomaly-
based detection schemes [26]. They occur in two phases:
a training phase during which the detector attempts to
learn to discriminate between the normal and abnormal
behavior/attributes, and a detection phase. Also referred
to as machine learning-based detection schemes, these
approaches are known to present two limitations: they
have high false alarm rates and determining what fea-
tures should be learned in the training phase is a complex
endeavour. A key step in these approaches thus resides
in the process of selecting datasets for training.
2.2 Machine Learning
As summarized by Alpaydin, “Machine Learning is pro-
gramming computers to optimize a performance criterion
using example data or past experience” [3]. A common
method of learning is known as supervised learning, a
scheme where the computer is helped through a first step
of training (as with a teacher). The training data consists
of Feature Vectors, each associated with a label, e.g., in
our case, apps that are already known to be malicious
(malware class) or benign (goodware class). After a run
of the learning algorithm, the output is compared to the
target output and learning parameters may be corrected
according to the magnitude of the error. Consequently, to
perform a learning that will allow a classification of apps
into the malware and goodware classes, the approach
must define a correlation measure and a discriminative
function.
Malware features & Training data To devise an ef-
fective similarity measure, one must first define what
app metadata, or code, characteristics can provide the
best indicators of potential malicious activities. Such
features must be extracted and potentially weighted fol-
lowing their importance. Then, one must determine the
threshold (or a much more complex measure) of features
value, that must be reached to be classified as malware.
As one could expect, given the importance of the
threshold and the kinds of features that will be retained as
good indicators, the extent and quality of training dataset
will drive all the assessment process. The training dataset
must thus be carefully sampled. The literature of An-
droid malware detection includes diverse examples of
features, such as n-grams of source code, API usages,
application permission uses, etc.
Machine Learning Algorithms & Other parameters
The execution of the machine learning process starts with
the construction of a classification model. The literature
of malware detection often implement approaches lever-
aging one of the algorithms that are well-known in the
community of machine learning. For instance, the Weka1
framework provides, amongst many others, the Ran-
domForest, J48, JRip and LibSVM implementations of,
respectively, Support Vector Machine (SVM) [19], the
RandomForest ensemble decision-trees algorithm [13],
the RIPPER rule-learning algorithm [18] and the tree-
based C4.5 algorithm [35]. A second variable of the pro-
cess is the extent of the class imbalance between good-
ware and malware in the training dataset. Finally, the
volume of features considered to discriminate malware
from goodware, also has an impact on the performance
of the detection technique.
In our work, because we focus exclusively on the his-
tory aspect, we constrain all aforementioned variables to
values that are widely used in the literature, or based on
our own experiments which have allowed us to select the
most appropriate settings. Furthermore, it is noteworthy
that we do not aim for absolute performance, but rather
measure performance delta between several approaches
of constructing training datasets.
2.3 Working Example
In this section, we provide details on the machine-
learning approach that will be used as a working exam-
ple to investigate the importance of history in the selec-
tion of training and test datasets. First, we show how our
features are sound and how findings based on these can
be generalized to state-of-the-art techniques. Second, we
briefly describe the features that we use.
A most common feature kind used in the literature of
machine-learning is N-grams which have shown to be
effective for text classification. Kephart has then pro-
posed to used N-grams for malware analysis [28], and
was recently followed by a large body of research in mal-
ware detection which have leveraged n-grams to generate
file/program signatures for the training dataset of mal-
ware [24, 29, 37]. We claim however that n-grams, by
slicing raw code/data as strings, cannot optimally cap-
ture the semantics of most malware, mainly because ma-
licious software increasingly look like goodware which
they often derive from. For the Android platform, Sahs
and Khan have recently proposed [36] to use a combi-
nation of Android permission and a representation of a
1http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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programs’ control-flow graphs (CFGs). Unfortunately,
not all malware are related to a permission issue, and
permissions are often misused by developers [9]. Nev-
ertheless, the CFGs contain much more information on
the execution behavior of a program. Thus, we build
a technique that extracts, from an application program,
data blocks that are semantically more relevant for exe-
cuted software.
Practically, we perform static analysis of Android ap-
plications’ bytecode to extract an abstract representation
of the program’s CFG. We obtain a CFG that is expressed
as character strings using a method devised by Pouik et
al. in their work on establishing similarity between An-
droid applications [34], and that is based on a grammar
proposed by Cesare and Xiang [15]. The string rep-
resentation of a CFG is an abstraction of the applica-
tion’s code; it retains information about the structure of
the code, but discards low-level details such as variable
names or register numbers. This property is desirable
in the context of malware detection as two variants of a
malware may share the same abstract CFG while having
different bytecode. Given an application’s abstract CFG,
we collect all basic blocks that compose it and refer to
them as the features of the application. A basic block is
a sequence of instructions in the CFG with only one en-
try point and one exit point. It thus represents the largest
piece of the program that is always executed altogether.
By learning from the training dataset, it is possible to
expose, if any, the basic blocks that appear statistically
more in malware. Overall, using an abstract representa-
tion of the code could allow resisting to basic forms of
obfuscation, a threat to validity that n-grams-based ap-
proaches cannot readily overcome.
The basic block representation used in our approach
is a high-level abstraction of small parts of an Android
application. Depending on its position inside a method,
one sequence of instructions may lead to different byte-
code because of a renumbering of VM registers. Our
abstract basic block representation however will always
produce the same string for one sequence of instructions
of a basic block, hence providing a higher resistance to
code variations than low-level representations such as n-
grams computed on bytecode. For reproducibility pur-
poses, and to allow the research community to build on
our experience, the data we used (full feature matrix and
labels) is available on request.
2.4 Methodology
This study is carried out as a large scale experiment that
aims at investigating the extent of the relevance of his-
tory in assessing machine learning-based malware de-
tection. This study is important for paving the road to
a true success story of trending approaches to Android
Marketplace # of Android apps Percentage
play.google.com 78 460 38.04%
appchina 72 093 34.96%
1mobile 32,017 15.52%
slideme 17 552 8.51%
anzhi 2 141 1.04%
proandroid 1 605 0.78%
fdroid 1 222 0.59%
genome 610 0.3%
freewarelovers 369 0.18%
apk bang 168 0.08%
Table 1: Origin of the Android apks in our dataset
malware detection. To this end, our work must rely on
an extensive dataset that is representative of real-world
Android apps and of datasets used in the state-of-the-art
literature. To account for the variety of classification al-
gorithms in machine-learning approaches, we rely on the
conclusions of a previous large-scale study by Allix et
al. [2] with similar machine learning features. Based on
this study, we have chosen to use the RandomForrest al-
gorithm which offers high classification performance. To
account for other execution parameters such as the ratio
between goodware and malware in training datasets, we
use standard, or recurrent, settings found in the literature.
Dataset To perform this study we collect a large
dataset of android apks from various markets. Table 1
provides information on the distribution of the appli-
cations in our dataset following the market where they
have been crawled from. A large majority of our dataset
comes from play.google.com, the official market, and
appchina.
An Android application is distributed as an .apk file
which is actually a ZIP archive containing all the re-
sources an application needs to run, such as the applica-
tion binary code and images. An interesting side-effect
of this package format is that all the files that makes
an application go from the developers computer to end-
users devices without any modification. In particular, all
metadata of the files contained in the .apk package, such
as the last modification date, are preserved. All bytecode,
representing the application binary code, is assembled
into a classes.dex file that is produced at packaging-time.
Thus the last modification date of this file represents the
packaging time. In the remainder of this paper, packag-
ing date and compilation date will refer to this date.
To infer the historical distribution of the dataset appli-
cations, we rely on compilation date at which the Dalvik2
bytecode (classes.dex file) was produced. We then sent
all the app packages to be scanned by virus scanners
2Dalvik is the virtual machine running Android apps.
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Figure 1: Historical distribution and Malware Proportions
hosted by VirusTotal3. VirusTotal is a web portal which
hosts about 40 products from renown anti virus vendors,
including McAfeer, Symantecr or Avastr. An appli-
cation is labelled as malware if any scanner flags it as
such. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of dataset as well
as the percentage of malware found in the subset of each
month. The drop in the number of applications in cer-
tain months are mainly due to some technical difficulties
that we have experienced in the collection of apps from
markets.
Machine learning Parameters In all our experiments,
we have fixed the number of features to 5,000. We thus
selected the 5,000 features with highest Information Gain
values as measured on the training sets. The RandomFor-
est algorithm was used for all our experiments.
3 Related Work
In this section, we propose to revisit related work to
highlight the benefits of our contributions in this paper.
We briefly present previous empirical studies to highlight
their significance for the malware detection field. Then
we go over the literature of malware detection to discuss
their assessment protocol.
3.1 Empirical studies
Empirical studies have seen a growing interest over the
years in the field of computer science. The weight of
empirical findings indeed help ensure that research di-
rections and results are in line with practices. This is
especially important when assessing the performance of
a research approach. A large body of the literature has
3https://www.virustotal.com
resorted to extensive empirical studies for devising a reli-
able experimental protocol [10,25,27]. Recently, Allix et
al. have proposed a large-scale empirical studies on the
dataset sizes used in the assessment of machine learning-
based malware detection approaches [2]. In their work,
the authors already questioned the assessment protocols
used in the state-of-the-art literature. Our work follows
the same objectives, aiming to highlight the importance
of building a reliable assessment protocol for research
approaches, in order to make them more useful for real-
world problems.
In the field of computer security, empirical studies
present distinct challenges including the scarcity of data
about cybercrimes. We refer the reader to a report by
Bo¨hme and Moore [11]. Recently, Visaggio et al. empir-
ically assessed different methods used in the literature for
detecting obfuscated code [41]. Our work is in the same
spirit as theirs, since we also compare different methods
of selecting training datasets and draw insights for the
research community.
With regards to state-of-the-art literature tackled in
this work, we note that a significant amount of Machine
Learning approaches to malware detection has been pre-
sented to the research community [1, 7, 8, 16, 22, 30].
Although most of those approaches could not be repro-
duced due to undisclosed parameters and/or undisclosed
datasets, we have compared their performance indicators
with our classifiers in similar 10-Fold evaluation setups.
Our classifiers achieved (1) better relative performance
metrics, and (2) high absolute performance metrics. This
demonstrates the soundness of the feature set we base our
experiments on. We further note that in the assessment
protocol of all these approaches, the history aspect was
eluded when selecting training datasets.
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Approach Year Sources Historical Coherence
[36] 2012 Undisclosed No
DROIDMAT [42] 2012 Contagio mobile for malware, Google Play for goodware No
[14] 2013 ”common Android Markets” for goodware, ”public databases of antivirus companies” for malware No
[4] 2013 Genome, VirusTotal, Google Play No
[20] 2013 Contagio mobile and Genome for malware, Undisclosed for goodware No
[43] 2013 ”from official and third party Android markets” for Goodware, Genome for malware No
[22] 2013 Google Play (labels from 10 commercial Anti virus scanners) No
DREBIN [7] 2014 ”Genome, Google Play, Chinese and russian markets, VirusTotal No
Table 2: A selection of Android malware detection approaches
3.2 Malware Detection & Assessment of
approaches
We now review the assessment of malware detection
techniques that are based on machine learning. For com-
paring performances with our own approach, we focus
first on techniques that have been applied to the Android
ecosystem. In Table 2, we list recent “successful” ap-
proaches from the literature of malware detection. We
describe the origin of the dataset used for the assessment
of the different approaches. For many of them, the appli-
cations are borrowed from known collections of malware
samples or from markets such as Google Play. They of-
ten use scanners from VirusTotal to construct the ground
truth. In our approach, we have obtained our datasets in
the same ways. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowl-
edge and according to their protocol descriptions from
the literature, none of the authors has considered clearly
ordering the data to take into account the history aspect.
It is therefore unfortunate that the high performances
recorded by these approaches may never affect the fight
against malware in applications markets.
Android malware detection The most recent achieve-
ment on machine learning-based malware detection for
Android is DREBIN [7]. The authors of this approach
have relied on different features from the manifest file
as well as the byte code to build its SVM classifiers.
The performance recorded in their paper are compara-
ble to the performances obtained with our classifiers built
during history-unaware 10-Fold experiments. DREBIN
goes further by providing explainable outputs, i.e., be-
ing able to somehow justify why an app was classified
as malware. Unfortunately, these performance records
might have the effect of a sword cutting through water
since the authors do not mention taking into account real-
world constraints such as the relevance of history.
In the remainder of this section we list related work,
provide details on the size of their dataset and compare
them to our history-unaware 10-Fold experiments. None
of them has indeed taken into account the history aspect
in their assessment protocol. In 2012, Sahs & Khan [36]
built an Android malware detector with features based
on a combination of Android-specific permissions and a
Control-Flow Graph representation. Their classifier was
tested with k-Fold 4 cross validation on a dataset of 91
malware and 2 081 goodware. We obtained comparable
values of recall but much higher values for precision and
F-measure. Using permissions and API calls as features,
Wu et al. [42] performed their experiments on a dataset
of 1 500 goodware and 238 malware. Many of our clas-
sifiers exhibit higher values of both precision and recall
than theirs. In 2013, Amos et al. [4] leveraged dynamic
application profiling in their malware detector. The eval-
uation metrics of their 10-fold experiment are slightly
lower than ours. Demme et al. [20] also used dynamic
application analysis to perform malware detection with
a dataset of 210 goodware and 503 malware. Many of
our 10-fold classifiers achieved higher performance than
their best classifier. Yerima et al. [43] built malware clas-
sifiers based on API calls, external program execution
and permissions. Their dataset consists of 1 000 good-
ware and 1 000 malware. Many of our 10-fold classi-
fiers achieved higher performance than their best classi-
fier. Canfora et al. [14] experimented feature sets based
on SysCalls and permissions. Their classifiers, evaluated
on a dataset of 200 goodware and 200 malware, yielded
lower precision and lower recall than ours.
Windows malware detection We have also explored
the research of machine learning-based malware detec-
tion for the Windows® platform. Approaches for this
platform have indeed inspired Android researchers and
experiments on Windows malware have provided in-
sights for dealing with Android malware. As for An-
droid approaches, we describe the features used and the
size of datasets. History aspects are however less rele-
vant in these cases, since there is no notion of market and
applications apparition/registration time. Kolter & Mal-
oof [29] performed malware classification on Windows
Executable files. Using n-grams extracted from those
4The value of k used by Sahs & Khan was not disclosed.
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binary files, and the Information Gain feature selection
method, they obtained high performance metrics with
10-Fold experimentations on two collections: The first
one consisting in 476 malware and 561 goodware, the
second one containing 1 651 malware and 1 971 good-
ware. Many of our 10-fold classifiers achieved higher
performance metrics. In 2006, Henchiri & Japkow-
icz [24] provided experimental results of a malware de-
tector based on a sophisticated n-grams selection algo-
rithm. They evaluated their classifier using 5-Fold5 on a
dataset of 3 000 samples, of which 1 512 were malware
and 1488 were goodware. The majority of our classi-
fiers achieved better results than Henchiri & Japkowicz
best ones, even though we used a simple feature selection
method. Zhang et al. [44] leveraged a multi-classifier
combination to build a malware detector. They evalu-
ated the quality of their detector with the 5-Fold method
on three datasets, each containing 150 malware and 423
goodware. The features they are using are based on n-
grams, and are selected with InfoGain. Zhang et al. men-
tions testing on a larger dataset as a future work. Schultz
and al. [38] performed malware detection using strings
and byte sequences as features. They obtained very high
recall and precision with 5-fold Cross Validation on a
dataset of 4 266 Windows executables (3 265 known ma-
licious binaries and 1 001 benign). Many of our clas-
sifiers performed similarly good or better. Perdisci et
al. [31] built a packed executable detector that achieved
near 99% accuracy. Their classifiers were trained on
4 493 labelled executables and then tested on 1 005 bina-
ries. The same authors leveraged their packed executable
detection method in [32] and added two malicious code
detectors, one of which is based on n-grams. They first
evaluated one of this detector with 5-fold cross valida-
tion on 2 229 goodware and 128 malware and the other
detector with 3 856 malware and 169 goodware. Finally,
their complete approach called “McBoost” was evaluated
with 5-fold on 3 830 malware and 503 goodware. Tahan
et al. recently presented “Mal-ID” [40], a malware detec-
tor that relies on high-level features obtained with Static
Analysis. Their experiments are performed with 10-fold
on a dataset built with 2 627 benign executables and 849
known malware.
4 Experimental Findings
In this section, we report on the experiments that we have
conducted, and highlight the findings. First we discuss
to what extent it is important that datasets remain histor-
ically coherent, as opposed to being selected at random
(cf. Section 4.1). This discussion is based on qualitative
5While 10-Fold is equivalent to testing 10 times on 10% while being
trained on 90% of the dataset, 5-Fold is equivalent to testing 5 times on
20% while being trained on 80% of the dataset.
aspects as well as quantitative evaluation. Second, we
conduct experiments that attempt to provide a hint to the
existence of lineages in Android malware in Section 4.2.
Subsequently, we investigate in Section 4.3 the bias in
training with new data for testing with old data, and in-
versely. Finally, we investigate the limitations of a naive
approach which would consist in accumulating informa-
tion on malware samples as time goes, in the hope of
being more inclusive in the detection of malware in the
future (cf. Section 4.4).
4.1 History-aware Construction of Train-
ing datasets
As described in Section 2.2, a key step of machine-
learning approaches is the training of classifiers. The
construction of the corresponding training dataset is con-
sequently of importance, yet details about how it is
achieved are largely missing from the literature.
There are two common selection patterns for training
datasets: (1) use a collected and published dataset of mal-
ware, such as Genome, to which one adds a subset of
confirmed goodware; (2) build the dataset by randomly
picking a subset of goodware and malware from a dataset
collected from either an online market or an open repos-
itory. Both patterns lead to the same situations: i.e. that
some items in the training dataset may be historically
posterior to items in the tested dataset. In other words:
• the construction of the training set is equivalent to
a random history-unaware selection from a mix of
known malware and goodware
• the history of creation/apparition of android appli-
cations is not considered as a parameter in assess-
ment experiments, although the practice of malware
detection will face this constraint
Following industry practices, when a newly uploaded
set of applications must be analyzed for malware identi-
fication, the training datasets that are used are, necessar-
ily, historically anterior to the new set. This constraint is
however eluded in the validation of malware detection
techniques in the research literature. To clearly high-
light the bias introduced by current assessment protocols,
we have devised an experiment that compares the per-
formance of the machine learning detectors in different
scenarios. The malware detectors are based on classi-
fiers that are built in two distinct settings: either with
randomly-constructed training datasets using a process
described in Figure 2, or with datasets that respect the
history constraint. To reduce the bias between these com-
parisons, we ensure that the datasets are of identical sizes
and with the same class imbalance between goodware
and malware. Thus to build a history-unaware dataset R0
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Figure 2: Process of constructing a random training dataset R0 for comparison with the training dataset constituted of
all data from month M0
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Figure 3: Classification process: the training dataset is either the dataset of a given month (e.g., M0) or a random
dataset constructing as in Figure 2
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Figure 4: Performance of malware detectors with history-aware and with history-unaware selection of training datasets
for comparing with training dataset constituted of data
from month M0, we randomly pick within the whole
dataset the same numbers of goodware and malware as
in M0. We perform the experiments by training first on
M0 and testing on all following months, then by training
on R0 and testing on all months (cf. Figure 3).
Figure 4 illustrates the results of our experiments.
When we randomly select the training dataset from the
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Figure 5: Performance of malware detectors: the training
set is drawn randomly either from the whole dataset or
from apps of month M10
entire dataset and build classifiers for testing applications
regrouped by month, the precision and recall values of
the malware detector range between 0.5 and 0.85. The
obtained F-Measure is also relatively high and roughly
stable. This performance is in line with the performances
of state-of-the-art approaches reported in the literature.
We then proceed to constrain the training dataset to be
historically coherent to the test dataset. We select mal-
ware and benign apps in the set of apps from a given
month, e.g., M0, as the source of data for building the
training dataset for the classification. The tests sets re-
main the same as in the previous experiments, i.e., the
datasets of applications regrouped by month. We observe
that as we move away from M0 to select a test data, the
performance considerably drops.
We have repeated this experiment, alternatively select-
ing each of the different month from our time-line as the
month from which we draw the training dataset. Then
we only consider testing applications that are posterior
to the selected month. Figure 5 illustrates results when
selecting training datasets from month M10.
Finding RQ-1: Constructing a training dataset that is
consistent with the history of apparition of applications
yields performances that are significantly worst than
what is obtained when simply randomly collecting ap-
plications in markets and repositories. Thus, without
further assessment, state-of-the-art approaches can-
not be said to be powerful in real-world settings.
Finding RQ-2: With random selections, we allow mal-
ware ”from the future” to be part of the training sets.
This however leads to biased results since the perfor-
mance metrics are artificially improved.
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Figure 6: Using training dataset from 1 month for testing
on all datasets of following months
4.2 Lineages in Android Malware
Our second round of experiments has consisted in inves-
tigating the capabilities of a training dataset to help build
classifiers that will remain performant over time. In this
step of the study we aim at discovering how the variety
of malware is distributed across time. To this end, we
consider building training datasets with applications in
each month and test the yielded classifiers with the data
of each following months as depicted in Figure 6.
Figures 7 and 8 provide graphs of the evolution over
time of, on the one hand, F-Measure and, on the other
hand, Precision and Recall of malware detectors that
have been build with a training dataset at month Mi and
applied on months Mk,k>i. Disregarding outliers which
lead to the numerous abrupt rise and breaks in the curves,
the yielded classifiers have, on average, a stable and high
Precision, with values around 0.8. This stability of Pre-
cision is confirmed by the shape of the Recall and F-
Measure curves. Indeed, these curves is similar, imply-
ing that the variations of Recall have more impact on the
harmonic measure than the Precision. This finding sug-
gests that whatever the combination of training and test
dataset months, the built classifiers still allow to iden-
tify with good precision the malware whose features have
been learned during training.
On the other hand, the Recall performance degrades
over time: for a given month Mi whose applications have
been used for the training datasets, the obtained classifier
is less and less able to identify all malware in the follow-
ing months Mk,k>i. This finding, correlated to the pre-
vious one, suggests that, over time, the features that are
learned in the training dataset correspond less and less to
all malware when we are in the presence of lineages in
the Android malware. We define a lineage as a set of
malware that share the same traits, whether in terms of
behavior or of coding attributes. Note that we differen-
tiate the term lineage from the term family which, in
the literature, concern a set of malware that exploit the
9
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
08/2011
M0
10/2011
M2
12/2011
M4
02/2012
M6
04/2012
M8
06/2012
M10
08/2012
M12
10/2012
M14
12/2012
M16
02/2013
M18
04/2013
M20
06/2013
M22
08/2013
M24
F-
M
ea
su
re
Month0 
Month1 
Month2 
Month3 
Month4 
Month5 
Month6 
Month7 
Month8 
Month9 
Month10 
Month11 
Month12 
Month13 
Month14 
Month15 
Month16 
Month17 
Month18 
Month19 
Month20 
Month21 
Month22 
Month23 
Month24 
Figure 7: Performance Evolution of malware detectors over time
same vulnerability. Lineage is a more general term.
The experiments also highlight the bias introduced
when training classifiers with a specific and un-renewed
set of malware, such as the Genome dataset. It also con-
firms why the random selection of malware in the entire
time-line as presented in Section 4.1, provides good per-
formances: many lineages are indeed represented in such
training datasets, including lineages that should have ap-
peared for the first time in the test dataset.
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Figure 8: Evolution of Precision and Recall evolution of
malware detectors over time
Finding-RQ3: Android malware is diversified. The ex-
istence of lineages complicates malware detection, since
training datasets must be regularly updated to include a
larger variety of malware lineages representatives.
4.3 Is knowledge “from the future” the
Grail?
Previous experiments have shown that using applica-
tions from the entire time-line, without any historical
constraint, favorably impacts the performance of mal-
ware detectors. We have then proceeded to show that,
when the training dataset is too old compared to the test
dataset, this performance drops significantly. We now in-
vestigate whether training data that are strictly posterior
to the test dataset could yield better performance than us-
ing data that are historically anterior (coherent). Such a
biased construction of datasets is not fair when the ob-
jective is to actively keep malicious apps from reaching
the public domain. However, such a construction can be
justified by the assumption that the present might always
contain representatives of malware lineages that have ap-
peared in the past.
In the Android ecosystem, thousands of applications
are created weekly by developers. Most of them, includ-
ing malware from new lineages, cannot be thoroughly
checked. Nevertheless, after some time, antivirus ven-
dors may identify the new malware. Machine-learning
processes can thus be used to automate a large-scale
identification of malware in applications that have been
made available for some time. Figure 9 depicts the F-
Measure performance evolution of the malware detec-
tors: for each month Mi, that is used for training, the ob-
tained classifiers are used to predict malware in the pre-
vious months Mk,k<i. The Recall evolution, outlined in
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Figure 9: Performance of malware detectors when using recent data to test on old datasets
Figure 10, and the F-Measure evolution follow the same
variations, suggesting that the impact of the average vari-
ations of the Precision is marginal, despite the shape of
the curve which should be attributed to outliers. Overall,
the performance is dropping significantly with the time
difference between test and training datasets.
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Figure 10: Evolution of Precision and Recall of malware
detectors when using recent data to test on old datasets
Finding-RQ4: Applications, including malware, used
for training in machine learning-based malware detec-
tion must be historically close to the target dataset that is
tested. Older training datasets indeed cannot account for
all malware lineages, and newer datasets do not contain
enough representatives of most malware from the past.
4.4 Naive Approaches to the Construction
of Training Datasets
Given the findings of our study presented in previous
sections, we investigate through extensive experiments
the design of a potential research approach for malware
detection which will be in line with the constraints of in-
dustry practices. At a given time t, one can only build
classifiers using datasets that are anterior to t. Never-
theless, to improve our chances of maintaining perfor-
mance, two protocols can be followed:
(1) Keep renewing the training dataset entirely to stay
historically close to the target dataset of test. This
renewal process must however be automated to re-
main realistic. In this scenario, we assume that a
bootstrap step is achieved with antivirus products at
month M0 to provide a first reliable training dataset.
The malware detection system is then on its own for
the following months. Thus, the classification that
is obtained on month M1, using month M0 for train-
ing, will be used “as is” to train the classifiers for
testing applications data of month M2. This system
is iterated until month Mn as depicted in Figure 11,
meaning that, once it is bootstrapped, the detection
system is automated and only relies on its test re-
sults to keep training new classifiers. In practice,
such an approach makes sense due to the high pre-
cision values recorded in previous experiments.
(2) Include greedily the most knowledge one can col-
lect on malware lineages This scenario is also au-
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M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Figure 11: Using malware classification results of month Mn−1 as training dataset for testing month Mn
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Figure 12: Comparing two naive approaches to the baseline of history-aware approach
tomated and requires bootstrapping. However, in-
stead of renewing the training dataset entirely each
month, new classification results are added to the
existing training dataset and used to build classifiers
for the following month.
Figure 12 shows the Precision and Recall performance
obtained in both scenarios. We compare these cases to
the baseline scenario where we keep using the classifiers
obtained at month M0 with labels from antivirus products
to detect malware for every other month (cf. Section 4.1).
The graphs show that by constantly using “fresh” data for
training in Scenario 1, we maintain the precision at stable
and higher rate than the baseline. However, by continu-
ously adding malware to form a training datasets with ap-
plications that are more or less fresh, we witness a steady
degradation of Precision in Scenario 2. The Recall per-
formance on the other hand follows opposite evolutions.
In Scenario 1, using fresh data obtained by classifiers
based on the data of previous month, leads to a steady
drop in Recall, while adding new malware detected to the
training datasets allows to maintain the Recall around to
the original baseline.
Both of these naive approaches have opposite advan-
tages and drawbacks. They provide insights, through
empirical evidence, on how machine learning-based mal-
ware detection systems should consider the construction
of training datasets.
Finding-RQ5: Maintaining performance of malware
detectors cannot be achieved by simply adding/renewing
information in training datasets based on the output of
previous runs. However, these scenarios have shown in-
teresting impact on performance evolution over time, and
must be further investigated to identify the right balance.
5 Discussion, Insights and Future work
In this section we summarize the key points developed in
this paper to enumerate the insights provided by our find-
ings. Based on these experimental results, we plan our
future work to devise realistic approaches for Android
malware detection using machine-learning techniques.
Findings
• History constraints must not be eluded in the con-
struction of training datasets of machine learning-
based malware detectors. Indeed, they introduce
significant bias in the interpretation of the perfor-
mance of malware classifiers.
• There is a need for building a reliable, and contin-
uously updated, benchmark for machine learning-
based malware detection approaches. We make
available, upon request, the version we have built
for this work. Our benchmark dataset contains
about 200,000 Android applications spanning 2
years of historical data of Android malware.
Insights
• Machine-learning cannot assure the identification of
an entirely new lineage of malware that is not repre-
sented in the training dataset. Thus, there is need to
regularly seed the process with outside information,
such as from antivirus vendors, of new lineages of
malware.
• In real world settings, practitioners cannot be pre-
sented with a reliable dataset for training. Indeed,
most malware are discovered, often manually, by
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antivirus vendors far later after they have been avail-
able to end-users. Large-scale ML-based malware
detection must therefore be used to automate the
discovery of variants of malware which have been
authenticated in a separate process.
Finding-RQ6: Building a reliable training dataset for
obtaining the best real-world performance requires a
right balance between the need for maximizing fresh data
and the need for including samples of most malware lin-
eages.
Threat to Validity
To perform this study, we have considered a unique
use-case scenario for using machine learning-based
malware detection. This scenario consists in
Actively preventing malware from reaching markets
and is extremely relevant to most real-world constraints.
Indeed, in practice, it is important to keep the window
of opportunity very narrow. Thus, to limit the number of
infected devices, Android malware must be detected as
they arrive in the market. It is therefore important that
state-of-the-art approaches be properly assessed, taking
into account history constraints.
There is however a second use-case scenario which
concerns online repositories for research and would con-
sist on cleaning such repositories regularly. In this sce-
nario, repositories maintainers attempt to filter malicious
apps once a new kind of malware has been discovered.
In such a context, practitioners can afford to wait for a
long time before building relevant classifiers for iden-
tifying malware that have been since in the repository.
Nevertheless, such repositories are generally of reason-
able size and can be scanned manually and with the help
of anti virus products.
Future work
• Building on the insights of our experiments, we
plan to investigate how to maintain the performance
of machine learning-based malware detectors until
antivirus vendors can detect a new strain of mal-
ware. This research direction could help bring re-
search work to be applied on real-world processes,
in conjunction with antivirus products which are
still widely used, although they do not scale to the
current rates of malware production.
• To account for the evolution of representations of
malware lineages in training datasets over time, we
plan to investigate a multi-classifier approach, each
classifier being trained with more or less outdated
data and weighted accordingly. A first challenge
will be on how to infer or automate the choice of
weights for different months in the timeline to build
the most representative training dataset.
6 Conclusion
Given the steady increase in the adoption of smartphones
worldwide, and the growth of application development
for such devices, it is becoming important to protect
users from the damages of malicious apps. Malware de-
tection has thus been in recent years the subject of re-
newed interest, and researchers are investigating scalable
techniques to spot and filter out apps with malicious traits
among thousands of benign apps.
However, more than in other fields, research in com-
puter security must yield techniques and approaches that
are truly usable in real-world settings. To that end, as-
sessment protocols of malware detection research ap-
proaches must reflect the practice and constraints ob-
served by market maintainers and users. Through this
empirical study we aim to prevent security research from
producing approaches and techniques that are not in line
with reality. Furthermore, given the performances re-
ported in state-of-the-art literature of malware detection,
while market maintainers still struggle to keep malware
out of markets, it becomes important to clear the research
field by questioning current assessment protocols.
In this paper, we have investigated the relevance of
history in the selection of assessment datasets. We have
performed large-scale experiments to highlight the dif-
ferent bias that can be exhibited by different scenarios of
dataset selection. Our main conclusion is that the assess-
ment protocol used for current approaches in the state-
of-the-art literature is far from the reality of a malware
detection practice for keeping application markets clean.
We have further investigated naive approaches to training
dataset construction and drawn insights for future work
by the research community.
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